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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. By G. W. F. Hegel. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by J. B. Baillie. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1910. 2 Vols. Pp. xliv, 823. (Paged continuously.)

Professor Baillie has conferred a very great boon upon students by this masterly translation of the most remarkable, if not absolutely the greatest, of Hegel's works. As he observes in his introduction, "Alike in its style of thinking, its manner of expression, the comprehensiveness of its survey, and the wealth of its material, it can hardly be said to have a parallel." It is an attempt, we might say, to show mind, on the great stage of history, transforming itself under the spell of logic, before and until it has detected the source of the wizardry. When once the enchantment is unmasked,—and throughout it is gradually unmasking,—mind can use the spell for itself; but then we are beyond the sphere of Phenomenology,—of mind immersed in matter,—and can deal directly with the leading principles of mind and the world; and this achievement is called absolute knowledge. But the Phenomenology deals with man's nature as a whole, with the needs, situations, emergencies, by which its powers are solicited and its principles evoked. It is therefore in the true sense 'genetic.' It is the great drama of consciousness, and goes, as Professor Baillie well points out in his introduction, through necessary steps to an inevitable outcome. Absolute knowledge might be compared with such an alteration in the human outlook as is embodied in the idea of the claims and interests of mankind as a whole. It is a standpoint the attainment of which is a great and, in one sense, a final achievement. But it is not the end of everything, nor a completed revelation of the reality of the universe. Like the idea of humanity, it is a revelation which marks an epoch, one from which we shall not go back, and which forms the medium in which further experience will develop. It is the recognition, clear and scientific, no longer a guess or a piece of poetry, that in the universe mind meets only with itself, and that when it thinks the universe it is thinking itself. And so far

it is a revelation of reality. But no one says or thinks that reality is exhausted in the statement or even in the abstract development of such a principle. It is a new starting point, and that is all.

Thus it seems natural that the account of Absolute Knowledge in this treatise should be short and somewhat summary. It is really in the *Logic* and in the *Philosophy of Religion* that we have to look for its development. The business of the *Phenomenology* was only to take us so far, and indicate where we have got to.

Hence I a little deprecate the tone in which Professor Baillie reinforces Hegel's modest apology for his work, in the letter to Schelling. All that is said in the introduction about Hegel's relation to his publisher is quite true,—that he had to keep his day with a man he could not trust, and that this tended to hurry the completion of his work, independently of the battle of Jena, to which Hegel himself refers. Yet it seems almost as if Professor Baillie had mixed up what Gans said of the roar of the cannon of Jena with what Hegel said, merely of his completing his book on the day before the battle. All sorts of disturbance had begun in Jena on that day, and it was wonderful that he could write at all. But one can well understand his not wanting to wait, not only because of his engagement to the publisher, but because he could not be sure how soon he might be able to return to work. In any case, however, I do not suppose he meant to give a systematic account of Absolute Knowledge.

But I strongly welcome the Translator's Introduction, the short introductory notes to separate sections of the treatise, and the information given in the brief but exceedingly serviceable footnotes. Hegel's course of thought is undoubtedly hard to follow, especially when, as in the present work, he has a great many things in his mind to which he does not refer by name. Translation, introductory notes, and footnotes, all seem to give the reader fixed points at which he may collect and with which he may compare his own impressions of the meaning. The rendering is exceedingly careful and well thought out, and the presentation of the work in this form is a very considerable event in the philosophical world. English readers may confidently rely on the author's meaning being accurately conveyed; and readers familiar with German will, I believe,

feel it a great help to study the translation and the original side by side. There are a few passages which I should have rendered otherwise, one or two of which I will refer to in a footnote. But there is nothing which seriously interferes with the apprehension of the author's meaning.

Of special importance in the present philosophical situation are the chapters on sense and perception. I do not think that the line of criticism which they represent has ever been stated more broadly or more pregnantly. Say, as Mr. Case says in the *Encyclopædia*, that you begin not with ideas or sensations, but with beliefs about objects. What does it matter? The question is what your beliefs come to if you let them go forward in their own right and by their own logic and methods. It is merely necessary to look on and let the thing work itself out, and you see, as is now really a commonplace, that as you go into science you go away from sensation, and into a huge complex of laws, relations, systems, and series. And then from this you must go further. I do not know any statement in which it becomes so clear that the realism which assumes objects apart from mind means artificial arrest of the natural process of knowledge; while realism which is true to the natural development of natural beliefs is simply the progress toward completeness which is the spring of idealism.

Another important point is the relation of the ethical system of a community to the morality of the Kantian type. The relation as given in the *Phenomenology* is reversed in the *Philosophy of Right*; and perhaps some discussion of this change, or at least a reference to it, would have been useful. I take it that the effect of the reversal is to give the system of ethical custom and observance a more universal and commanding place in the interpretation of life, and to treat as more remote from reality and from religion the standpoint of any morality which very strongly and in principle opposes the 'ought' to the 'is.'

It is further interesting to note how near Hegel's idea of the notion came to Bergson's view of 'life,' only without its limitations.

"As to time . . . it is the notion itself in the form of existence. The principle of quantity, of difference which is not determined by the notion, and the principle of equality, of abstract lifeless unity, are incapable of dealing with that sheer restlessness of life, and its absolute and inherent process of differentiation. It is therefore only in an arrested, paralyzed form; only in the form of the quantitative unit, that this essentially negative activity

becomes the second object-matter [besides space] of this way of knowing [viz., the mathematical], which, itself an external operation, degrades what is self-moving to the level of mere matter, in order thus to get an indifferent, externally, lifeless content." Philosophy is different. "The abstract or unreal is not its element and content, but the real, what is self-establishing, has life within itself, existence in its very notion. It is the process that creates its own moments in its course" (Translation, p. 43).

This is a good specimen of the translation, as well as of Hegel's argument. I subjoin in a note some details with reference to the translation:

NOTE:—The translation has been carefully thought out, and conveys the meaning with remarkable success. It uses some circumlocution, and a good deal of freedom in the rendering of single terms. This is often very serviceable, but in places alarms me a little. *E. g.*, I am afraid of all usage of 'concept' and 'conceptual' in connection with *Begriff* or *begreifen* (see pp. 6, 7, 64; 789, 793; here, *e. g.*, 'bare concept=*reiner Begriff*,' 'conceptually'=*seinem Begriff nach*). It must be understood that no touch of meaning allied to 'conceptualism' is intended. So, surely, something is lost when "*die Anstrengung des Begriffs*" becomes "the strenuous toil of conceptual reflection, of thinking in the form of the notion" (p. 56).

Note also p. 65: "exclude everything which is not grasped conceptually, and is a conception." Is not —'nor is a conception' the meaning?

P. 81: "Anxiety for the truth" should be "shrinking from the truth."

P. 135 (a difficult passage about force inciting and force being incited): Each, Hegel has said, is purely through the other, "that is to say, their being has purely the significance of disappearance" (Tr. rightly). Below comes "*Ihr Wesen ist dies schlechthin, jede nur durchs andere, und was jede so durchs andere ist, unmittelbar nicht mehr zu seyn, indem sie es ist.*" Tr. says "rather their true nature is simply and solely to be each through the other, and to be in the first instance no more than just what each is thus through the other, since it is just that." Surely it is "for each to be only through the other, and in virtue of such being immediately to cease to be what it thus is through the other." The meaning is practically that of the sentence cited above.

P. 731: I suppose the translator read '*vereinigt*' where I find '*gereinigt*.' But is not '*gereinigt*' right? The soul is one with being in the purification attained through the cultus (p. 725-6).

P. 732: 'Selfless' should surely not be carried on affirmatively with the last clause. Is not the meaning: 'The absolute Being, at this stage, has not the selfless reality of an outcast nation, but the reality of a nation whose self is acknowledged'?

P. 768: "Consciousness does not . . . start from thought and enclose the thought of God along with existence." "*Zusammen schliessen*" seems to me to mean conjoining extremes by inference in a middle term; consciousness does not start from its own inward thought, and conjoin the thought of God with outward existence in its own thinking [as a middle term]; "but sees God directly in the outward existence."

P. 788: "Those apparently repugnant moments . . . are not inseparable": read "are not separable."

These points are mostly trivial, and I do not think that there are any amendments of greater importance to suggest.

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MATTER AND MEMORY. Henri Bergson. Authorized translation.

By Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1911. Pp. xx, 339. (Library of Philosophy.)

In view of the great interest recently aroused in the English-speaking countries by the work of M. Bergson and the laudation bestowed on it by Professor James, the publishers are to be thanked for following up the translation of "*Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience*" with this version of what is in some ways M. Bergson's most remarkable performance. In the main the translators may be congratulated on their accomplishment of the extraordinarily difficult task of reproducing a French work in readable English. I would note, however, as minor blemishes, several cases in which undue adherence to the phrasing of the original has led them to produce sentences where the grammatical subject is placed after its predicate. This is a type of structure common in good French prose, but rigidly eschewed by writers with a sense of English style, and the places where it occurs should be modified whenever the book comes to be reissued. It is one of the chief rules which a careful translator ought never to forget that the ideal of translation is to be not only faithful, but idiomatic; no construction should be allowed which compels the reader to remember that what he has before him is a version and not an original work. I note also one or two unfelicities in vocabulary which might readily be removed. 'Back and forth' is, to the sense of the British reader, at any rate, a provincialism for 'backwards and forwards'; on pages 214, 216 the verb 'to accrue' is used in a transitive sense which is, I believe, unknown to our language, and the same thing is true of the sense put upon the verb 'to interest' at the end of the first paragraph of page 293. You can say in good English that the mathematical concept of absolute homogeneous space is 'of interest for' our practical interaction with the material world, but to say 'it interests a